the 1970s in the evolution of the field remains a contested debate among revisionist scholars.
As human rights scholars, we reflect this opposition between universalist and revisionist within the literature yet we are agreed that there is no single concept of human rights rather human
rights are 'open-ended and ambiguous '. 12 Therefore, we pull on Slotte and Halme-Tuomisaari's work as they conceptualise human rights as 'open-ended and ambiguous' yet seemingly absolute and weighted. They see this conceptual vagueness or 'open-endedness as key to the usefulness of human rights because it allows anyone to argue their preferences as belonging to the human rights category'. 13 Therefore, they examine human rights as forming a language and this portrays 'rights as forming an endless semantic battlefield upon which participants argue over the meaning of key concepts'.
14 This concept of law as language and a 'site of politics' draws on the literature of critical legal scholars that identify the indeterminacy of law and the structural biases of institutions. as a semantic battlefield is a 'site of politics' in which participants to struggle for hegemony over their opponents. 16 In this sense, all legal discourse 'is a surface over which political opponents engage in hegemonic practices, [enlisting] its rules […] and institutions on their side, making sure they do not support the adversary'. 17 As any legal vocabulary is political open-ended, it means that 'what gets read into it (or out of it) is a matter of subtle interpretative strategy'. 18 In this sense, 'political struggle is waged on what legal words such as "aggression"….mean, whose policy will they include, whose will they oppose',
To think of this struggle as hegemonic is to understand that the objective of the contestants is to make their partial view of that meaning appear as the total view, their preference seem like the universal preference.
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In the case of international law specialisms, such as the human rights law regime, an issue can be framed in terms of the particular specialism, decided within that particular specialism's institutional setting and in turn, secure the success of certain legal arguments that follows the general bias of the deciding institution. 20 For instance, in the Ireland v United Kingdom case, both Governments re-described their political positions regarding the British Government's security policy in Northern Ireland using the rights language of the European Convention on Human Rights and sought to deploy the language and concepts of the Convention strategically within the Convention's institutions. For the Irish Government, the aim was to secure as a legal outcome a reading of internment, introduced in August 1971, as an excessive security measure in circumstances of the emergency situation, and the treatment of detainees, including the use of sensory deprivation techniques, as violations of article 3 of the Convention, prohibiting torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.
Similarly, Slotte and Halme-Tuomisaari's approach to the dilemma of history-writing is useful for situating 'events' within the wider historiography of human rights as a global phenomenon.
They advise academic researchers 'to trace down meanings invested in [rights] claims as well as examining the processes accompanying their making as well as exploring why they were made in first place'. 21 In Slotte and Halme-Tuomisaari's edited work, they read the Universal Declaration of Human Rights era as an 'important moment of beginning' because it is 'an imagined reference point of origin' that is 'in retrospect' invoked in endless documents; it becomes an origin because it is imagined and invoked as such. 22 In this sense, myth and reality become enmeshed that shows the difficulty of writing human rights history with any certainty. 23 Applying their approach, we suggest that the 1970s period is an 'imagined reference point of "breakthrough"' of human rights with 'lines of continuity' to human rights activism of the 1990s. 24 Therefore, although we do not focus on the debate over origins/breakthrough per se, we take as our point of departure that the emergence of the contemporary human rights project was dependent on historio-political dynamics, using human rights as a language strategically, within institutional contexts. 3 of the Convention. 44 The Commission had found that the 'five techniques' as applied in combination had a systematic character similar to systems applied in previous times for inducing information or a confession. 45 Nevertheless, although the Court acknowledged the systematic character of the 'five techniques and their purpose in extracting information, it ruled that the practice did not have the 'intensity' of pain and suffering to amount to a practice of torture but rather was a practice of inhuman and degrading treatment. 46 The Court ruled that the Convention attaches a special stigma to torture as 'deliberate inhuman treatment causing very serious and cruel suffering'.
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The controversy over the legal classification of the 'five techniques', whether constituting a practice of torture or inhuman treatment, continues to have contemporary significance because the Court's approach has been invoked in other international contexts, even though the Court itself has evolved its approach in its more recent judgments. 48 For instance, the US Office of Dr Leigh had earlier given evidence as the British Government's expert witness before the European Commission of Human Rights and had argued that from his assessment of two illustrative cases (P.C. and P.S.), they suffered acute psychiatric symptoms at the time of being subjected to the five techniques. 54 82 In international law, the exhaustion of domestic remedies rule had certain exceptions to overrule the application of the rule, that is, where the domestic remedies were ineffective or illusory. 83 Ireland v The United Kingdom, Application No, 5310/71 Report of the Commission (25 th January 1976), 254, citing the Greek Case ('if there is an administrative practice of torture or ill-treatment, judicial remedies prescribed would tend to be rendered ineffective by the difficulty in securing probative evidence…').
In the Commission's jurisprudence, an administrative practice has two requirements, a 'repetition of [the alleged] acts' and an 'official tolerance'. The former involves 'a substantial number of acts…which are the expression of a general situation', that is, the acts demonstrate a pattern of violations. The latter means 'though the acts…are illegal, they are tolerated in the sense that the superiors of those immediately responsible through cognisant of such acts, take no action to punish…or prevent their repetition'. 84 Alternatively, a higher authority faced with numerous allegations 'manifests indifference by refusing any adequate investigation of their truth or falsity, or that in judicial proceedings, a fair hearing…is denied'. 85 We focus here on the strategic use by the Irish Government of the 'official tolerance' element within the concept of administrative practice. In its submissions, the Irish Government argued the acts alleged
were 'of such a character, over such a length of time and in such circumstances' that it was impossible for the acts to have occurred without the knowledge of 'superiors to those immediately responsible'. 86 In this respect, they stated to the Commission that they were not making allegations 'personally against any member of the British Government'. 87 In reply, the British Government denied any authorisation for acts contrary to article 3 and argued that the level of tolerance envisaged in the Greek case was 'a superior of such a rank as to be entitled It would…neither be fair nor reasonable to regard condonation by subordinate officers of acts forbidden by higher authorities as an administrative practice for which the Government is responsible and there was no evidence of such toleration. 88 On the five techniques, in particular, the British Government submitted that the Commission should distinguish the techniques from other article 3 allegations and decline to proceed further as these had been expressly discontinued. Therefore, although the Irish Government's arguments were rooted in the Commission's jurisprudence, this avenue was to some extent unchartered territory and there was no absolute guarantee of successfully overcoming the exhaustion of domestic remedies hurdle. 91 Regarding the other article 3 allegations, the Commission found that, although not admitted, the British Government did not submit any counter-evidence or make any detailed comments on the evidence submitted by the Irish Government. It also agreed with the Irish Government that the article 3 allegations had to be examined as a whole and other forms of alleged illtreatment cannot be considered in isolation from the five techniques. 95 In this sense, the Commission found that the Irish Government sustained its arguments to overcome the exhaustion of domestic remedies rule and in turn, most of its application (as an arguable case) was admitted for assessment on its merits.
When the Commission rendered it decision, both the Agents of the Irish and British
Governments were profoundly shocked. Mahon Hayes recalled that he and the British Agent Paul Fifoot remained on in Strasbourg at the end of the Admissibility hearings to await the decision. had been admitted to the Merits stage. When he turned to look at Paul Fifoot, he 'was in state of shock'. 97 The British officials 'were horrified. They never thought that so much would be admitted -they may have thought that some little thing would have got through as a token…But obviously [they] were horrified, shock beyond belief'. 98 Hayes explained that for the Irish legal team, there were greater celebrations at the outcome of the Admissibility decision than at other stages of the legal proceedings because the admissibility stage was read as particularly critical.
It had been assumed that the Irish Government would be successful to a small extent because at the very least, the credibility of the Convention 'would have been affected…if the Commission threw out this major inter-state case'.
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The Merits Stage and Article 3 of the Convention
Another strategic use of the Convention language and its institutions was the Irish Daly explained that while the particular paper was discussed and copies were provided in advance, it 'was headed in such a way that it indicated it was not allowed to be discussed it was satisfied long-term effects could not be excluded and it did not preclude a finding of practice of torture given the systematic nature of the combined techniques. 133 In this sense, the Commission privileged the counter-narrative of the Irish Government's expert testimony as against the British Government's expert testimony because they accepted the 'systematic nature' of the combined techniques.
CONCLUSION
The Within the merits stage examination, the witness hearings of psychiatric expert opinion on the interrogation methods was also not an inevitability but rather the outcome of an intensely contested dispute between the Irish and British counsels before the Commission's Sub- 
